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CHANGES IN BUSINESS OPERATIONS: THE
EFFECTS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR




Virtually all businesses eventually go through structural
changes of one sort or another. Employers** often contract out
work and shut down a part of their operations; many companies
sell a part of their operations or buy part or all of another em-
ployer's business; and many employers decide to terminate op-
erations, partially or entirely. When any such change in opera-
tions occurs, and there exists a bargaining representative of the
employees affected by the change, there are several labor law prob-
lems which must be dealt with. These arise in two contexts:
one involving the effects of the National Labor Relations Act,1
and the other involving any union contract which exists at the
time of the change.
The following discussion focuses on major changes in a bus-
iness operation and the possible effects of the National Labor Re-
lations Act and a union contract on such changes. The discus-
sion should provide a reasonably reliable guide to the practicing
attorney who does not often encounter problems in this compli-
cated, intriguing, and rapidly developing area of the law.
I. COMPLETE CLOSURE
In the case of a complete termination of an employer's opera-
tions the employer has no statutory duty to bargain with the
union about the decision to shut down.2 Although the National
Labor Relations Board has not yet interpreted the Act as re-
* A.B. 1954, Tufts University; LL.B. 1959, Harvard; Member, California
State Bar.
** The author would prefer to use non-sexist pronouns in reference to em-
ployers in this article but in the interest of readability he has, following the
conventions of the English language, utilized the masculine pronoun.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970) [hereinafter cited as NLRA or the Act].
2. NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1967).
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quiring an employer to bargain with the union regarding a de-
cision to cease operations entirely, in recent years the law has pro-
gressed towards requiring more bargaining with employees' rep-
resentatives.8 If this trend continues, any change in this area in
the next few years will very likely favor a bargaining requirement
rather than employer autonomy. For this reason, it is advisable
even when totally shutting down operations to give the union an
opportunity to bargain. By doing so, an employer loses nothing,
but gains protection against an unfair labor practice charge in the
event that the law should change soon after his shutdown."
Complete closure, not followed by reopening at another lo-
cation, does not constitute an unfair labor practice even if moti-
vated by anti-union animus. The leading case in this area is
Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing Co.' in
which the employer had closed one of his plants because the em-
ployees had approved union representation in an NLRB election.
The Court held that where a complete shutdown of an entire
business, as opposed to the closure of only one of several plants,
is motivated by anti-union prejudice, closure cannot be regarded
as an unfair labor practice. The court observed that a contrary
holding would prevent a single businessman from going out of
business, a result which
. . . would represent such a startling innovation that it should
not be entertained without the clearest manifestation of a
legislative intent or unequivocal judicial precedent .... 6
To open the bargaining process, the employer need only give
the union notice that the closure is under consideration, and that
the employer is willing to bargain with the union about the de-
cision and its possible effects. Although formal notice is not
required,7 a letter to the union's headquarters is advisable.
3. See, e.g., id.; Burns International Security Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 406
U.S. 272 (1972); Fibreboard Paper Products v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
4. Complete cessation of operations should be distinguished from the situa-
tion where the employer closes his operations with the intention of opening a
similar business in a new location. In such instances there may be a finding
of an unfair labor practice on the theory of a "runaway shop", discussed in
the text under PARTIAL CLOSURE, section II, infra.
5. 380 U.S. 263 (1965). However, the Darlington Company was an inte-
grated part of a larger corporation and, as such, it was necessary to determine
if the single plant closing was motivated by, and would have the reasonable ef-
fect of, chilling unionism at other plants of the same employer. See discussion
in text under PARTIAL CLOSURE, section II, infra.
6. Id. at 270.
7. Section 8(d)(1) of the Act, 25 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1) (1970) requires writ-
ten notice by either the employer or the union to the other party of any pro-
posed termination or modification of the collective bargaining agreement. This
language is sufficiently broad for the Board, at some future time, to find a re-
quirement of notice before closure and resulting termination of the contract.
[Vol. 14
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At present the time of notice of the pending decision to
close is not legally significant since the notice itself is not re-
quired. But prudence dictates that such notice, if given, should
be timely as it is designed to afford protection against a possible
change in the law which would require adequate notice. Gener-
ally, the timeliness of such notices is determined on the facts of
the case, with the National Labor Relations Board and the courts
less concerned with the actual length of time involved than with
the employer's good faith approach to the bargaining. Thus,
failure to give any advance notice was an unfair labor practice
when, during contract negotiations prior to closure, the employer
had attempted to solidify the impression of continuation of the
business.8 Yet, closure without advance notice was held not to
constitute an unfair labor practice if there was no evidence of
employer bad faith.9 In the absence of extraordinary circum-
stances, an employer can probably rely on the decision in Low-
ery Trucking Co.,'" to the effect that one week's notice is suffi-
cient. 1
Also significant is the matter of union attention to the no-
tice. The courts have repeatedly held that:
[W]hen a union has sufficiently clear and timely notice of an
employer's plan to relocate, close or subcontract and there-
after makes no protest or effort to bargain about the plan,
it waives its right to complain that the employer acted in
violation of Sections 8(a)(5) [duty to bargain collectively
in good faith] and (1) [prohibition against interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
rights to organize]. 12
Thus, a union's failure to respond to an employer's invitation
to bargain regarding a closure, subcontract or relocation, relieves
the employer of his bargaining obligation.
Despite the fact that the NLRB has not yet read the Act
as requiring bargaining in advance of the decision to close, the
employer may have a contractual requirement to consult the union
prior to irrevocably deciding to close. Thus, an existing collec-
8. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 191 (3rd Cir.
1965).
9. G.W. Murphy Industries, Inc., 184 N.L.R.B. No. 9, 76 L.R.R.M. 1730
(1970); cf. NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933 (9th Cir.
1967) (three days notice held insufficient).
10. 196 N.L.R.B. No. 74, 80 L.R.R.M. 1036 (1972).
11. However, to allow for possible enlargement of the time needed for an
appropriate notice, the employer may wish to notify the union at least two weeks
in advance of closure.
12. International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 463
F.2d 907, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1972 (holding no timely notice, therefore no waiver).
See also NLRB v. Spun-Jee Corp., 385 F.2d 379 (2d Cir. 1967).
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five bargaining agreement may expressly require consultation with
the union when closure is contemplated. If the agreement is am-
biguous concerning the duty to bargain but contains an arbitra-
tion clause, the arbitrator may interpret the contract to require
bargaining. Here, also, prior notice to the union would be advis-
able if an employer considers discontinuing operations. Such no-
tice and consultation, however, would not guarantee that the em-
ployer could cease operations without liability if an arbitrator
found a contractual provision which prohibited cessation of busi-
ness without the union's approval. Such contractual provisions are
not common and can be avoided by skillful bargaining.
The employer's responsibility to the employees does not nec-
essarily terminate with plant closure. If the collective bargain-
ing agreement in force calls for termination benefits in the form
of severance pay, re-employment preference, assistance in finding
substitute employment or other requirements, the employer must
comply with these provisions. Additionally, if any contract terms
arguably provide for such benefits and the contract provides for
arbitration for settlement of disputes, a disagreement over the
meaning of the contract may result in arbitration.1"
If the contract clearly does not provide any severance bene-
fits for employees, or if an arbitrator resolves any ambiguity on
that point in favor of the employer, under the Act the employer
must, nevertheless, bargain with the union about the effects of
the closure on the employees whose employment status is altered
by the closure. 14  Effects include such matters as severance pay,
vacation pay, seniority and pensions, and other matters of impor-
tance to employees effected by the closure.15 These are "terms
and conditions of employment" within the meaning of the bar-
gaining requirements of section 8(a) (5) of the Act.'6 In the
13. Arbitration will be discussed in the text in more detail under StJCON-
TRACTINO, section III, infra.
14. The company need not bargain over a decision to terminate operations,
but
once such a decision is made the employer is still under an obligation
to notify the union of its decision so that the union may be given the
opportunity to bargain over the rights of the employees whose employ-
ment status will be altered by the managerial decision.
NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1967). Thus
the employer has the sole right to decide whether or not to close completely.
However, if he decides to close he may still have a continuing obligation to
temper the effects of closure on his employees and he must bargain with the
union on the latter issue.
15. NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1967);
Royal Plating & Polishing Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 191 (3rd Cir. 1965).
16. Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970) declares it
an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with
representatives of his employees. Section 8(d) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
[Vol. 14
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course of such bargaining, severance pay, re-employment rights and
any other matters relating to the effects of the closure upon the
employees may be raised. It should be noted, however, that the
good faith bargaining obligation under the Act does not require
either party to reach an agreement.
17
I. PARTIAL CLOSURE
An employer, faced with fiscal or other pressures, may
find it necessary to shut down a part of his operations. The
employer may completely close a part of the operations or he may
sell his own interest in part of the operations to another employer
who continues the operations.
Under the National Labor Relations Act
If an employer intends to phase out a particular part of his
operation, typically one of several plants owned or operated by
that employer, his responsibilities under the Act are related to
those involved in a complete closure. Present Board law requires
that the employer give notice to the union prior to making a de-
cision to effectuate a partial closing and, if requested, to bargain
with the union about the decision.' 8  The United States Courts
of Appeal have not consistently supported the Board's view,
and some courts have declined to enforce Board orders finding
failure to notify and bargain with the union violative of the Act."9
Nevertheless, given the Board's position and the trend of the law
in this area, notice should be given to the union.
In addition to notice and bargaining over the decision it-
self, the employer must bargain about the effects of the closure
upon the employees involved.2" As with a complete closure, the
employer would be wise to notify the union in advance of the de-
(1970) declares that the parties must bargain collectively with respect to wages,
hours and other terms and conditions of employment.
17. Section 8(d) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970). The Act requires
a good faith effort to reach agreement but does not require actual agreement.
NLRB v. W.R. Hall Distributer, 341 F.2d 359 (10th Cir. 1965); Jeffrey-De
Witt Insulator Co. v. NLRB, 91 F.2d 134 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S.
731 (1937).
18. See discussion note 6 supra. McLoughlin Mfg. Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. No.
23, 65 L.R.R.M. 1025 (1967) (an employer must bargain over relocation of his
business, but here failure to bargain was excused); Bickford Shoes, Inc., 109
N.L.R.B. 1346, 34 L.R.R.M. 1570 (1954).
19. NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1967);
NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961).
20. Royal Optical Mfg. Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 64, 49 L.R.R.M. 1432 (1962);
Diaper Jean Mfg. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1045, 34 L.R.R.M. 1504 (1954), enforced
sub nom. NLRB v. Tredway, 222 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1955).
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cision to close in order to avoid the possibility of being found
guilty of committing an unfair labor practice.2'
In contrast to total closings, partial closings involve a wider
application of the Act. The motivation behind a total shutdown
may come from any source, even anti-union sentiment, and a
charge of unfair labor practice under present law will not be sus-
tained. 2 However, if a partial closing is the result of anti-union
motivation or is intended to chill unionism in any of the em-
ployer's remaining plants and the employer could reasonably have
foreseen that the closing would be likely to have such an effect,
then he may be found guilty of violating section 8(a)(3) of the
Act.2 1  The Board order in such a situation may require rein-
statement of the affected employees with back wages.24
A similar problem arises if the employer intends to close a
plant and reopen it elsewhere. This action is referred to as a
"runaway shop." If the employer's purpose in moving his
operations is in whole or substantial part to chill unionism, the
Board may order reinstatement of employees, as in the case of an
ordinary partial shutdown, and may award back pay and pay-
ment of traveling expenses for the employees who accept rein-
statement at the new location. It may additionally order the em-
ployer to bargain with the union. It must be pointed out that,
although an employer does not enjoy absolute autonomy in the
matters of termination or partial termination of his business, an
unfair labor practice charge will ordinarily be sustained only if
the employer's sole or preponderant consideration in undertaking
the action is the chilling or destruction of unionism. If the em-
ployer's motive is purely or primarily economic, he may under-
take the action without fear of a section 8(a)(3) violation.2"
21. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
22. See text accompanying notes 4 and 5 supra.
23. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965). Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970) prohibits discrimination
in hiring or tenuring that would encourage or discourage membership in a union.
24. See Cooper Thermometer Co. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1967),
enforcing in part Cooper Thermometer Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 1902, 63 L.R.R.M. 1219
(1966).
25. Local 57, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 374
F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 942 (1969). Here, employer moved
from New York to Florida. The Board ordered preferential reinstatement for
New York employees, back pay and bargaining at the new location. The appeals
court upheld the first two but refused to enforce the bargaining order on the
premise that few New York employees would seek reinstatement and such an
order would deny the employees at the new Florida location freedom of choice
of representatives. In addition, the court expressed general willingness to en-
force the bargaining order as a remedy for a "runaway shop." Id. at 303.
26. See, e.g., NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961). Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970) provides that it is an
unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in hiring or tenure or any
[Vol. 14
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Under Contract
If there is a total shutdown of one plant or a part thereof,
there may be contractual obligations to be fulfilled. If the con-
tract requires severance pay or re-employment preference for the
affected employees, these obligations must be met. If the con-
tract is silent regarding shutdowns, the employer must offer to
bargain about the effects of the closure on the employees. In
the event that ambiguities appear regarding the closures, and the
union initiates grievance procedures, the dispute may go to an
arbitrator for final resolution. This does not necessarily mean
that the employer's autonomy will be upheld. In some cases,
arbitrators have found collective bargaining agreements to be re-
strictive. For example, in 1968 an employer terminated his op-
erations in his Hawaii plant, laid off his employees working at that
facility, and offered employees a choice of severance pay or trans-
fer to the mainland. The arbitrator read the contract as requiring
the employer to pay the terminated employees a sum equivalent
to their regular straight-time hourly rate for the remainder of the
period covered by the existing collective bargaining agreement.17
Thus, the employer must carefully scrutinize his collective bar-
gaining contract for any language which may be interpreted as
imposing obligations on the employer in plant closure situations.
III. PARTIAL SHUTDOWN WITH CONTINUATION
-(SUBCONTRACTING)
More problematic is an employer's partial cessation of op-
erations where another employer continues in his place. This
situation resembles, and in many cases will actually be, subcon-
tracting." Board policy requiring an employer to bargain with
the union concerning subcontracting has won Supreme Court ap-
proval in Fiberboard Paper Products v. NLRB,29 a case involv-
ing the contracting out of plant maintenance work which had
previously been performed by company employees. The Court's
holding there was limited to a situation where the work in ques-
tion had previously been performed by company employees and
the company was merely replacing existing employees with those
of an independent contractor doing the same work under similar
conditions. The Court held that "to require the employer to bar-
term or condition of employment in order to encourage or discourage union
membership.
27. RCA Communications, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 10, 1 CCH Lab. Arb.
Awards 3594 (1969).
28. If the transaction is actually a sale, then a different set of problems
arises, as discussed in the text in section V infra.
29. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
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gain about this matter would not significantly abridge his free-
dom to manage the business."80
Some courts have construed the Fibreboard holding as not re-
quiring bargaining if the subcontractor will, definitely and to a
significant degree, alter the character or conditions of the work
performed, change the character or size of the unit, or invest
capital in the business."' In contrast, the Board has not shared
the courts' narrow reading of Fibreboard, and tends to give the
Supreme Court holding broad application.82 Therefore, to fore-
close any possibility of a Board order to cancel the subcontract,
and to reinstate the employees laid off, 8 an employer would be
well advised to bargain with the union before engaging in sub-
contracting.
The Darlington decision on complete closure also bears on
this situation. In order to avoid committing an unfair labor prac-
tice, an employer should leave no doubt that anti-union senti-
ment was not the motivation for the partial shutdown. If the
Board finds subcontracting motivated by discriminatory reasons,
it will, following Darlington, order reinstatement with back pay.
Aside from the unfair labor practice limitations, there might
be other considerations which will restrict the employer. For in-
stance, the extant contract may prohibit subcontracting. Even
if the contract is silent on the specific matter of subcontracting,
the matter of the employer's freedom to subcontract is arbitrable.
The arbitrator will evaluate various factors in determining whether
subcontracting is prohibited by the contract, including the employ-
30. Id. at 213. The court noted that:
The facts of the present case illustrate the propriety of submitting the
dispute to collective negotiation. The Company's decision to contract
out the maintenance work did not alter the Company's basic operation.
The maintenance work still had to be performed in the plant. No cap-
ital investment was contemplated; the Company merely replaced existing
employees with those of an independent contractor to do the same work
under similar conditions of employment.
Id.
31. See, e.g., NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966).
32. See, e.g., Westinghouse Electric Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. 1574, 58 L.R.R.M.
1257 (1965) in which the Board observed that subcontracting of work without
prior bargaining with the union has been found to be an unfair labor practice
where,
[there is] a departure from previously established operating practices,
[and the subcontracting] effected a change in conditions of employment,
or resulted in a significant impairment of job tenure, employment se-
curity, or reasonably anticipated work opportunities for those in the
bargaining unit.
Id. at 1576, 58 L.R.R.M. at 1258. The Board in this case, however, held there
was not such a significant departure from previous operations, etc. to render sub-
contracting a mandatory subject of bargaining.
33. Both directions were ordered in Fibreboard.
[Vol. 14
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er's reasonableness and good faith in subcontracting the work.8 4
This is an imprecise test involving a combination of several fac-
tors. Among these are past practice 5 and past negotiations"'
of the parties with regard to subcontracting; the possible valid jus-
tification for the decision, including economic justifications;87
and the intended effect on the union-that is, whether the em-
ployer intends by subcontracting to weaken or strengthen the
particular union involved. 8
A further consideration is the effect of the action on unit
employees-whether seniority, job security, work load, or other
factors will be affected.39 In this regard, the arbitrator will con-
sider the type of work involved" and the feasibility of its per-
34. National Sugar Refining Co., 13 Lab. Arb. 690 (1949). See also F. EL-
KOURI & E. ELKOJRi, How ARBITRATION WoRKS 237-39 (1960).
35. See, e.g., American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 44 Lab. Arb.
947 (1965); White Motor Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 682 (1964); American Airlines, Inc.,
29 Lab. Arb. 594 (1957); but cf. Weber Aircraft Corp., 24 Lab. Arb. 821 (1955).
In Weber, the arbitrator held that the union was not charged with knowledge
and thus acquiescence in past practices of subcontracting did not bind them. The
employer did not inform the union of his use of outside employees nor were
union officials actually aware of them.
36. See, e.g., Singer Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 840 (1965); American Airlines, Inc.,
27 Lab. Arb. 174 (1956) (arbitrator ruled that the company retained the right
to subcontract despite union attempts during contract negotiations to obtain a
ban on such subcontracting); Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Co., 24 Lab. Arb.
158 (1955) (arbitrator ruled that management retains all its pre-contract rights
unless they contract to the contrary, and here, there had never been any negotia-
tions concerning subcontracting).
37. See, e.g., National Cash Register Co., 48 Lab. Arb. 400 (1967) (expedit-
ing necessary work during period of increased temporary absences); Dalmo Victor
Co., 24 Lab. Arb. 33, 37 (1954) (acceptable business justifications); Amoskeag
Mills, Inc., 8 Lab. Arb. 990 (1947) (economic jus tification); but cf. Thompson
Grinder Co., 27 Lab. Arb. 671 (1956) (unit employees not offered weekend
overtime prior to subcontracting to independent contractor).
38. See, e.g., Milprint Inc., 46 Lab. Arb. 724 (1966) (employer had obliga-
tion to notify union before subcontracting); Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 27
Lab. Arb. 413, 420 (1956) (arbitrator found subcontracting not discriminatory
against union).
39. See, e.g., Safeway Stores, Inc., 51 Lab. Arb. 1093 (1969) (no violation
for subcontracting because other work was offered unit employees and there was
no showing of specific instances of work loss produced by subcontracting); Beth-
lehem Steel Co., 30 Lab. Arb. 678 (1958) (subcontracting violated implied "local
working conditions" agreement as to exclusivity of work being performed by unit
employees); Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., 26 Lab. Arb. 723 (1956) (subcon-
tracting which resulted in discharge of unit employees violated contract); Kop-
pers Co., Inc., 22 Lab. Arb. 124 (1954) (no evidence that subcontracting re-
sulted in loss of pay or lay-off for any unit employee).
40. See, e.g., Mead Corp., 52 Lab. Arb. 345 (1969) (no violation for sub-
contracting out new or special work); Pittsburgh Metallurgical Co., 52 Lab. Arb.
41 (1969) (subcontracting violated contract because work was normally per-
formed by unit employees who possessed requisite skills); Bethlehem Steel Co.,
30 Lab. Arb. 679 (1958) (subcontracting of work which was traditionally and
historically subject of subcontracting in the industry violated contract here be-
cause of local working arrangement and implied agreement not to subcontract);
Hershey Chocolate Corp., 28 Lab. Arb. 491 (1957) (no violation for subcontract-
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formance by unit employees, 4 as well as the availability to the
employer of any special equipment required for the work.42 The
intended duration 48  and regularity of the subcontracting44 will
also influence the arbitrator's decision; for example, objections to
quarterly maintenance of buildings would be of less significant im-
pact than a contract for continuous production of a part of the
employer's product by an outside company.45 In each case, a bal-
ancing of the factors mentioned, in addition to others which may
arise, should furnish a basis for an indication of the arbitral de-
cision.
IV. SALE OF ENTIRE BUSINESS
The sale of an entire business bears few hidden difficulties
for the seller. He must avoid the "chilling" effect delineated in
Darlington.4" Furthermore, he must anticipate that a "sale" will
be treated as such only if the transaction actually comprises a
transfer of control, 47 and is not merely a "wash" sale. Except
for these complications, an employer may sell his business at any
time. A complete sale is, in legal effect, the same as a total clos-
ure of business for the seller. The only truly significant limita-
ing work incidental to employer's primary operation); A.D. Juilliard Co., Inc.,
21 Lab. Arb. 713 (1953) (subcontracting of work normally performed by unit
employees violated contract).
41. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp., 47 Lab. Arb. 1057 (1966) (subcontract-
ing violated contract when unit employees had requisite skill and had performed
like work in the past, but not when it was the most reasonable course in urgent
situation); Joseph S. Finch & Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 609 (1957) (no violation for
subcontracting out emergency work not feasibly performed by unit employees).
42. See, e.g., Dutch Maid Bakery, 52 Lab. Arb. 589 (1969) (no violation
for subcontracting when company unable to obtain replacement part for key ma-
chine thus creating continuing emergency); Hershey Chocolate Corp., 28 Lab.
Arb. 491 (1957) (subcontracting permissible because substantial capital outlay
to purchase new equipment would have been necessary to perform job "in-
house").
43. See, e.g, Temco Aircraft Corp., 27 Lab. Arb. 233 (1956) (no violation
for subcontracting work of limited scope and duration); General Metals Corp.,
25 Lab. Arb. 118 (1955) (subcontracting violated contract since work was to
be done continuously and permanently and, considered with other factors, should
have been assigned to unit employees).
44. See, e.g., Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 27 Lab. Arb. 413 (1956) (sub-
contracting did not violate contract when work had never been necessary before
and work was special or unique); Temco Aircraft Corp., 27 Lab. Arb. 233 (1956)
(no violation for subcontracting unique, special repair work).
45. See, e.g, Taylor Stone Co., 50 Lab. Arb. 208 (1967) (no violation for
subcontracting work connected with employer's conversion of operations to more
modernized plant); Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 23 Lab. Arb. 603 (1954)
(no violation for subcontracting out work when unit employees observed picket
line even though it resulted in subsequent lay-offs when employees returned to
work).
46. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
47. Cf. Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9 (1945).
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tions in such circumstances arise from contractual provisions and
the required notice to the union.4 8
The more difficult problem is the determination of the
legal obligations of a purchaser of an on-going business to bar-
gain with an incumbent union. The question is characterized
as one of "successorship."
Under the Act
The problems of successorship under federal legislation are
several, and have undergone change as recently as April of
1973 .49 Although this legal area is in a state of flux at the pres-
ent time, there are several basic factors which have emerged from
recent rulings. The Board employs the following considerations
in deciding whether an employer is or is not a "successor" em-
ployer:
(1) whether there has been a substantial continuity of the
same business operations; (2) whether the new employer
uses the same plant; (3) whether he has the same or sub-
stantially the same work force; (4) whether the same jobs
exist under the same working conditions; (5) whether he
employs the same supervisors; (6) whether he uses the same
machinery . . . ; and (7) whether he manufactures the
same product or offers the same services. 50
In NLRB v. Burns International Security Service, Inc.,51 a union
had been elected to represent guards employed by Wackenhut
Corporation at a Lockheed plant. Shortly thereafter, the guard
service contract expired and, after bidding, the contract was
awarded to a different guard service company, Burns International
Security Service. Burns retained twenty-seven of the Wackenhut
employees and brought in fifteen additional employees. Further-
more, Burns continued to follow an operating structure and op-
erating practices similar to Wackenhut's. The Supreme Court
adopted the Board's basic test-a union majority in an unchanged
bargaining unit in essentially unchanged circumstances - and
ordered the new employer to bargain with the incumbent
union. 5 2
If these factors indicating successorship status are absent,
then a company which assumes control of another has no duty
to bargain with the union, and there is no continuation of any
48. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
49. Denham v. NLRB, 411 U.S. 945 (1973).
50. Fanning, Labor Relations Obligations of a Purchaser, in 1967 LABOR RE-
LATIONS YEARBOOK 284, 286 (1967).
51. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
52. Id. at 281.
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pre-existing union contract. If, however, the Board determines
that the new employer is a "successor", then there is a duty upon
the new employer to recognize and bargain with the union, but
no duty to accept any collective bargaining agreement which
bound the previous employer and the union. 8
After Burns, a "successor" still may be required to arbitrate
pre-existing grievances, but he may not be forced to comply with
the provisions of the previous contract with regard to wages, hours,
working conditions, and other substantive matters.
In early 1973, the United States Supreme Court remanded
for modification a decision of the Board which attempted to ex-
'tend the Burns decision. In Denham v. NLRB54 a successor em-
ployer purchased his predecessor's plant, retained all unit em-
ployees and carried on substantially the same operations. The
Board found that the employer had committed unfair labor prac-
tices by refusing to adhere to a collective bargaining contract be-
tween his predecessor and the incumbent union and refusing to
bargain with the union.5 On appeal, the Supreme Court re-
versed the Board's finding of a violation of section 8(a)(5)
(refusal to bargain in good faith)"6 arising from a unilateral
change in working conditions at the beginning of a successor's
business operations. The Court in Burns had observed that:
It is difficult to understand how Burns could be said to have
changed unilaterally any pre-existing term or condition of
employment without bargaining when it had no previous re-
lationship whatever to the bargaining unit and . . . no out-
standing terms or conditions of employment from which a
change could be inferred.5 7
Thus, the Supreme Court's remand of Denham, citing only Burns,
indicates that Burns may not be interpreted as binding successor
employers to previous contracts and that successor employers may
make unilateral changes after giving notice to the incumbent
union.
53. Until the Supreme Court in Burns clarified its earlier decision of John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964), some courts had required
a "successor" to accept the previous collective bargaining agreement. Wiley,
however, was a section 301 (Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley
Act) § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970)) suit to compel a successor employer to
arbitrate with the union under a collective bargaining agreement with the prior
employer, and should not therefore have controlled any unfair labor practice case
resulting from a refusal to accept the entire contract which bound a previous
employer.
54. 187 N.L.R.B. 434, 76 L.R.R.M. 1141 (1970), review granted, 411 U.S.
945 (1973), modified on remand, 206 N.L.R.B. No. 75 (Nov. 2, 1973).
55. Id.
56. 411 U.S. 945 (1973).
57. 406 U.S. at 294.
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On remand in Denham, the Board rescinded its finding that
the employer had illegally refused to be bound by his predeces-
sor's contract with the union. However, the Board adhered to
its finding that the employer had committed unfair labor prac-
tices by refusing to bargain with the union and thereafter uni-
laterally changing working conditions. 8 Thus, the duties of a
successor employer are by no means resolved by the Denham de-
cision and will very likely be the subject of litigation for some
time.
If a successor employer is reluctant to accept union recogni-
tion as inevitable, he may attempt to avoid a "successor" deter-
mination by arguing that his hiring of employees or investment
in the company effects a significant change in the structure, size,
or character of the bargaining unit. 9 Or he may be in a posi-
tion to intermingle employees of two plants if, for example, he
purchases a larger plant and moves some of his previous em-
ployees to that plant. In such circumstances the previous bar-
gaining unit may be considered extinct in light of the new unit
and new operations.6" If the successor employer already had a
collective bargaining contract with one union, there may be grounds
for a representation election to decide which of the two unions
is the proper representative of unit employees after the change-
over.(1 Also, the Board's unit clarification representational pro-
cedure 2 is available to the employer and the union to clarify
changes in the bargaining unit effectuated by the new em-
ployer.
Under Contract
If there is a successor clause in the previous contract, re-
quiring the new employer to recognize the union, the issue of
whether the successor company is so bound is arbitrable.63 Al-
though the Denham decision does not bind a successor employer
to his predecessor's collective bargaining agreement in the ab-
sence of a successorship clause in the collective bargaining con-
tract, it is possible that an arbitrator confronted with similar
58. 206 N.L.R.B. No. 75 (Nov. 2, 1973).
59. However, an employer may be found to have violated section 8(a)(3)
of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (discrimination in hiring to discourage union
membership) if his refusal to hire the previous employer's employees is moti-
vated by a desire to avoid union representation. Tri-State Maintenance v.
NLRB, 408 F.2d 171 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
60. See, e.g., Hooker Electrochemical Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1393, 38 L.R.R.M.
t482 (1956).
61. Cf. Globe Machine and Stamping Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 294, 1-A L.R.R.M. 122
1937).
62. 29 C.F.R. § 102.61(d) (Supp. 1973).
63. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
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circumstances may interpret other contract language to bind a
successor employer to the agreement. It is advisable, therefore,
to scrutinize existing collective bargaining contracts for such a
possibility before a purchase is consummated.
V. PARTIAL SALE
Under the Act
A partial sale is very close to a total sale in its legal ramifica-
tions with the exception that a partial sale is scrutinized more
closely for a possible Darlington discriminatory partial closing.
Discriminatory action in a partial sale as in a partial closure may
result in a Board order requiring reinstatement and back pay to
the affected employees. Furthermore, in partial sales as well as in
partial closing, the employer must give notice to and bargain
with the union involved, with respect to both the decision itself
and the effects thereof on the employees.
Purchasing a portion of an enterprise imposes restrictions on
the new employer, much the same as those involved in pur-
chasing an entire operation. Indeed, if the portion of opera-
tions transferred comprises one or more complete bargaining
units, the successorship problems will be the same as if a transfer
of an entire business had occurred. If, however, the partial
sale involves only a portion of a bargaining unit, there will be
stronger arguments available to the purchaser for nonrecognition
of the union, disregard of any previous contract, merger into a
new unit, and in general greater successor autonomy. The union
will not be as successful in retaining its status as employees' repre-
sentative if the new unit includes many employees not previously
associated with the union or with the selling employer. Repre-
sentational questions which arise in these circumstances are norm-
ally resolved by unit clarification or other related Board repre-
sentation procedures.
Under Contract
Under an existing collective bargaining agreement, there
may be difficulties for both partial seller and buyer. The seller
may be prohibited by contract terms from selling any portion of
his operations. Sale of the facilities may be restricted to those
who will agree to honor the existing contract, or rehire or offer
hiring preference to a substantial number of the unit employees.
Additionally, the contract may contain severance pay provisions.
If the seller effects a sale in violation of any such contractual pro-
visions, as evident from their terms or as decided by an arbitra-
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tor, he may be liable to the employees for any damages they in-
cur.
There may be contractual complications for the purchaser as
well. He may be forced by the seller to agree to some of the
terms just mentioned, before the sale may be completed. And
he, too, may be bound to a previous collective bargaining agree-
ment as a successor.
6 4
VI. CONCLUSION
In any termination of business by an employer, the Board
and courts will be concerned with the employer's motive and
fulfillment of his bargaining obligation to the union. Anti-union
motives or failure to fulfill any bargaining obligation may result
in an order restoring in whole or in part the status quo ante. Fur-
thermore, an arbitrator may read the contract as requiring that
the employer must not close his business or that he must make
certain remuneration to his employees.
In a partial closing or subcontracting, the employer must
not be motivated by discriminatory purposes, and should bargain
with the union if permitted by contract to undertake the proposed
action.
Finally, in preparation for the prospective purchase of a busi-
ness or a part thereof, a purchaser should scrutinize any pre-
existing contract. If there are no significant problems arising
from possible interpretation of contract language, he should con-
sider the disadvantages of allowing any existing certification or
conduct to extend into the period after the acquisition. The pur-
chaser should also consider alternative structures for the bargain-
ing unit and choose and later implement, if possible, the one best
suited to his business needs.
64. See discussion in section IV supra.
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